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Who do you believe? 
By David Hearne, Researcher, Centre for Brexit Studies 
As a species, we are pretty incredible. The fact that I am writing this 
(and you are reading it) is testament to that fact. Our ability to 
communicate is phenomenal. 
The fact that I am not merely writing this but am typing it – watching 
individual letters appear as I move my fingers on a keyboard – is 
astonishing. That this is happening on a screen and I can edit my 
words as I go along is even more so. 
You might be reading it on a miniaturised version of the device I’m 
using – in which billions of transistors switch back-and-forth and 
electrical signals are sent to a screen in order to produce patterns that 
your brain decodes as language. Unbelievable. In my pocket lives a 
similar device that is able to take photographs and send them as well 
as access much human knowledge. 
That such devices not only exist but are produced in vast quantities 
and at prices low enough for billions of people to own one is 
something that is beyond the wildest imaginings of our ancestors. As 
a species, we produce enough to feed, clothe and house the world 
(amply) with resources left over for luxuries. We don’t, but that’s 
another story. 
We are endowed with physical attributes that render us dangerous 
enemies in the animal kingdom. Most of us are capable of doing 
mathematics (by which I mean multiplication and division) that would 
bedevil other species. Yet we are also endowed with major 
weaknesses. 
We are incredibly “bad” at time. By this I mean that we repeatedly and 
consistently violate “sensible” treatment of time. In common with many 
primates, we appear to discount time hyperbolically rather than 
exponentially, for example. There are perfectly good biological 
reasons for this[1] and it is optimal in several situations[2] but it means 
that we exhibit unstable preferences and decisions over time. 
The problem is that we don’t exist in the world we have evolved to 
deal with. Hyperbolic discounting might work well in the animal 
kingdom, but it works against you when you’re a student wanting to 
revise for exams. These responses are hardwired into us – it isn’t 
our fault that we act in a time-inconsistent manner. 
On a related subject, we struggle with risk. It is well-documented that 
our attitudes to risk/reward are not symmetric, but we also appear to 
make quite strange (and serious) errors on a consistent basis when 
faced with uncertainty. 
We are also “bad” at certain forms of coordination. We are very 
successful when coordinating small groups. It is no accident that we 
form tribes. 
This breaks down when trying to coordinate large numbers who do 
not know each other. If the human race could coordinate properly, we 
could eliminate Covid (and myriad other diseases). Certainly, this was 
a possibility earlier during the pandemic. Look at Wuhan where such 
coordination was coerced. 
Finally, we have a tendency to emotional reasoning. This is far from 
an avowed negative – our ability to “feel” is powerful and hugely 
valuable. When we lack domain-specific knowledge (and sometimes 
even when we have domain-specific knowledge) we rely on 
what feels like the right decision (who we trust is an important part of 
this). Aligned to this we tend to privilege and overemphasise our own 
experience. 
It often boils down to whether we believe, one way or another. Yet 
belief is the language of religion and the divine – things beyond 
human comprehension and knowledge. Not merely things we do not 
know, but things we cannot know. 
All of these are evident in tackling many of the world’s problems. Take 
climate change – it involves credibly committing to take action (now 
and in the future). Not good for a species that discounts 
hyperbolically! 
It also entails asymmetric risks and great uncertainty. We know that 
greenhouse gas emissions are  having a profound impact on our 
climate, but we don’t know specifics (including what tipping points we 
might reach and when). We also know that the risks are asymmetric – 
things could turn out slightly better than we predict or a lot worse. That 
should affect our behaviour. 
Our inability to coordinate also hurts us here. Getting all countries to 
agree (and enforce) measures is profoundly difficult. There are big 
incentives to “cheat” and not reduce emissions by as much as we 
should. That might be rational from an individual perspective, but it is 
socially harmful. Such cheating is rarer in small groups because the 
costs of ostracism are enormous. 
Finally, few of us are equipped to analyse the data or the models it 
underpins – this requires specialist knowledge and a good deal of 
time. As a result, we fall back on our emotional reasoning. How do 
you feel about climate change? What do you believe and who do you 
trust? What are your own experiences? None of us like hearing bad 
news, especially if our livelihoods are at stake and the experience of a 
hard winter can cause us to underplay climate change, even when 
this is not rational or supported by data. 
The same phenomena are at work in Brexit, both in terms of the 
decision itself and in terms of preparation. It’s easy to see why we’re 
unprepared: hyperbolic discounting and uncertainty over the final 
settlement are not our friends here. 
It’s also easy to see the coordination problems involved: both in 
negotiations (both sides are better off with an agreement, and yet it’s 
entirely feasible that there won’t be one) and preparations. 
After all, for preparations to be successful, the British government and 
French (and others) alongside the overwhelming majority of 
businesses need to ensure everything works smoothly. Yet it only 
takes a handful to have filed paperwork incorrectly to create a backlog 
that affects disparate businesses in different sectors. 
As for the decision itself, it is clear that Brexit as a phenomenon 
sparks huge emotions. How many people can honestly – hand on 
heart – say that they regard the whole thing with completely cool 
detachment. 
Yet in actuality, it is a remarkably dry and, dare I say it, boring subject. 
It is about legal frameworks, proper procedures and econometric 
analysis (technically CGE models are not econometric but many of 
the inputs are estimated based on econometric results). Very few 
have the time or background to fully master one of these domains let 
alone all of them. 
The reality then is that people made (and make) choices based on 
feelings and trust. What information do you trust? We are told, one 
way or another, to believe. 
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